On Sun, Feb 19, 2023 at 10:18:40AM +0100, Stefan Sperling wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 18, 2023 at 05:15:38PM +0100, Omar Polo wrote:
> > since we're apparently in the quoting business I guess we may need
> > something more robust that handles paths with ' in them.
> > 
> > Maybe this is the reason git-shell is so picky.
> > 
> > could be even done as a separate step, fwiw ok op@ if you want to just
> > commit this.
> 
> I will think some more about this. I really don't like having to deal
> with quoting issues at this layer.

I suspect we really cannot avoid doing some escaping.
This patch uses the same escaping rules as used by OpenBSD's locale(1).

ok?

diff cee3836880940ba0d1203e0682a43a680132bc27 351ffb4d09aa704fe94d74437802d0b5c0812f8f
commit - cee3836880940ba0d1203e0682a43a680132bc27
commit + 351ffb4d09aa704fe94d74437802d0b5c0812f8f
blob - 3325c8994f55721d8588155cdc72b95d11fd2248
blob + e0687bfb44ce75c1677a5a42f7457e8dd31caaed
--- lib/dial.c
+++ lib/dial.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "got_error.h"
@@ -200,6 +201,55 @@ const struct got_error *
 	return err;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Escape a given path for the shell which will be started by sshd.
+ * In particular, git-shell is known to require single-quote characters
+ * around its repository path argument and will refuse to run otherwise.
+ */
+static const struct got_error *
+escape_path(char *buf, size_t bufsize, const char *path)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+	const char *p;
+
+	/* We will need at least this much space: */
+	if (bufsize < strlen(path) + 3)
+		goto toolong;
+
+	memset(buf, 0, bufsize);
+	buf[i++] = '\''; /* git-shell compat */
+
+	p = path;
+	while (*p != '\0') {
+		switch (*p) {
+		case ' ': case '\t': case '\n': case '\'':
+		case '(': case ')': case '<': case '>':
+		case '&': case ';': case '|': case '~':
+		case '"': case '\\': case '$': case '`': 
+			if (i >= bufsize - 1)
+				goto toolong;
+			buf[i++] = '\\';
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		default:
+			if (i >= bufsize - 1)
+				goto toolong;
+			buf[i++] = *p;
+			break;
+		}
+		p++;
+	}
+
+	if (i >= bufsize - 1)
+		goto toolong;
+	buf[i++] = '\'';
+	if (i >= bufsize)
+		goto toolong;
+	buf[i] = '\0';
+	return NULL;
+toolong:
+	return got_error_fmt(GOT_ERR_NO_SPACE, "overlong path: %s", path);
+}
+
 const struct got_error *
 got_dial_ssh(pid_t *newpid, int *newfd, const char *host,
     const char *port, const char *path, const char *direction, int verbosity)
@@ -209,10 +259,15 @@ got_dial_ssh(pid_t *newpid, int *newfd, const char *ho
 	char cmd[64];
 	const char *argv[11];
 	int i = 0, j;
+	char escaped_path[PATH_MAX];
 
 	*newpid = -1;
 	*newfd = -1;
 
+	error = escape_path(escaped_path, sizeof(escaped_path), path);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
 	argv[i++] = GOT_DIAL_PATH_SSH;
 	if (port != NULL) {
 		argv[i++] = "-p";
@@ -228,7 +283,7 @@ got_dial_ssh(pid_t *newpid, int *newfd, const char *ho
 	argv[i++] = "--";
 	argv[i++] = (char *)host;
 	argv[i++] = (char *)cmd;
-	argv[i++] = (char *)path;
+	argv[i++] = (char *)escaped_path;
 	argv[i++] = NULL;
 	assert(i <= nitems(argv));