From: Omar Polo Subject: Re: gotd auth unveil To: Stefan Sperling Cc: gameoftrees@openbsd.org Date: Fri, 30 Dec 2022 09:29:35 +0100 On 2022/12/29 20:58:55 +0100, Stefan Sperling wrote: > On Thu, Dec 29, 2022 at 07:27:00PM +0100, Stefan Sperling wrote: > > Remove filesystem access via bind(2) from gotd's auth process. > > See the added comment for rationale, and keep in mind that > > AF_UNIX bind(2) requires unveil "w". > > > > ok? > > Omar pointed out on IRC that we need to add an unveil rule > before locking unveil. ok for me too. > diff 365cf0f34d08316d433e730a8663283029f729b3 fdc9c76e0b23708faf82df8e055ddf5895344150 > commit - 365cf0f34d08316d433e730a8663283029f729b3 > commit + fdc9c76e0b23708faf82df8e055ddf5895344150 > blob - 05f659daea632d0e305556351e4d6a5e97519fa0 > blob + b79d7d9818993976319266976df74331b6ba4d71 > --- gotd/gotd.c > +++ gotd/gotd.c > @@ -2371,6 +2371,16 @@ apply_unveil(void) > } > > static void > +apply_unveil_none(void) > +{ > + if (unveil("/", "") == -1) > + fatal("unveil"); > + > + if (unveil(NULL, NULL) == -1) > + fatal("unveil"); > +} > + > +static void > apply_unveil(void) > { > struct gotd_repo *repo; > @@ -2582,9 +2592,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) > break; > case PROC_AUTH: > #ifndef PROFILE > - if (pledge("stdio getpw recvfd unix", NULL) == -1) > + if (pledge("stdio getpw recvfd unix unveil", NULL) == -1) > err(1, "pledge"); > #endif > + /* > + * We need the "unix" pledge promise for getpeername(2) only. > + * Ensure that AF_UNIX bind(2) cannot be used by revoking all > + * filesystem access via unveil(2). Access to password database > + * files will still work since "getpw" bypasses unveil(2). > + */ > + apply_unveil_none(); > + > auth_main(title, &gotd.repos, repo_path); > /* NOTREACHED */ > break;